




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(i)



CONTACT DETAILS OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE (AAIC-BD)			
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(ii)

INTRODUCTION

This incident investigation is being conducted by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee of Bangladesh (AAIC-BD), in accordance with Rule 6 (c) of Aircraft Accident and Serious Incident Investigation Rules 2023 (AASIIR-2023) and in conformity with Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation.

This Preliminary Investigation Report has been issued to project an updated status of the 'Notification' on the aforementioned incident.

On 16 May 2025, the Head of AAIC-BD learnt from Civil Aviation Authority of Bangladesh that one of the Dash-8 Q-400 of Biman Bangladesh Airlines, Registration No S2-AJW got airborne with one main wheel detached during take-off roll at VGCB, Cox's Bazar Airport. The ATC Tower Controller of VGCB informed the flight crew about the wheel detachment from the aircraft during take-off roll. The PIC of the aircraft decided to continue the flight to Dhaka for better emergency and maintenance facility.

Having learnt about the occurrence, the Head of AAIC-BD advised one-member 'Go-team' to move to the airport at VGHS Airport, Dhaka. Upon reaching at the airport, the go-team member found that the aircraft had already landed safely with one left main wheel (inner) missing. The aircraft cleared the active runway and was switched off at South Alpha taxiway. All passengers were disembarked without any injury/ harm.

Pursuant to Rule 33 of the AASIIR-2023 and Standard 4 of Annex 13 the Office of the AAIC-BD issued a 'Notification' on 17 May 2025 for information of all concerned (National and International). To conduct the investigation, the Head of AAIC-BD designated the Member of Engineering of the AAIC-BD as the Investigator-in-Charge (IIC) with one-member (Operations) to form the Aircraft Accident Investigation Team (AAIT), which was issued through a 'Memorandum'.

The information contained in this preliminary report has been derived from the factual information and evidences gathered so far during the on-going investigation of the occurrence and is being circulated and published, pursuant to Rule 27 of AASIIR-2023 and Standard 7.4 of Annex 13.

The AAIC-BD conceives that any investigation and analysis which would be made thereof, should focus on identifying the root cause(s) and/or contributing factor(s) rather than indicating on some human omissions for the occurrence.

As per Rule 16 (1) of AASIIR-2023 and ICAO Annex 13, the sole objective of this investigation is to prevent aircraft accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.

Pursuant to Rule 29 of AASIIR-2023 and Standard 6.5 of ICAO Annex, in the interest of accident prevention, the AAIC-BD shall make the 'Final Report' publicly available as soon as practicable and, if possible, within twelve months from the date of the occurrence.

Head Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee Bangladesh

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(iii)

List of Acronyms

CVRCockpit Voice RecorderDMEDistance Measuring EquipmentFDRFlight Data RecorderFSRFlight Standard & RegulationsICAOInternational Civil Aviation OrganizationIICInvestigator-In-ChargeLHLeft handLTLocal TimeLtdLimitedMBMillibarN/ANot ApplicableNDBNon-Directional BeaconN NENorth, North EastNMNautical mileNSCNo Significant Cloud	S
NM Nautical mile	
NDT Non-Destructive Test	
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer	
OPS Operations PIC Pilot in command	
PIC Pilot in command PFI Pre-flight Inspection	
PPL Private Pilot License	
REG Registration	
RWY Runway	
SOP Standard Operating Procedure TSB Transport Safety Board	
US United States	
UTC Coordinated Universal Time	
VFR Visual Flight Rules	
VGCB Cox's Bazar Airport	
VGHS Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport, Dhaka	
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range	

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1. TITLE

1.1 Composition of Title

1.1.1 Name of the Operator	Biman Bangladesh Airlines Ltd.
1.1.2 Name of the Manufacturer	De Haviland Aircraft Canada
1.1.3 Aircraft Model	DHC-8 Series-400
1.1.4 Aircraft Nationality	Bangladesh
1.1.5 Aircraft Registration Marks	S2-AJW
1.1.6 Place of Accident/ Serious Incident/ Investigable Incident	VGCB, Cox's Bazar Airport
1.1.7 Date of Accident/ Serious Incident/ Investigable Incident	16 May 2025

2. SYNOPSIS

2.1 Details of Synopsis

2.1.1 Notification of accident/ serious incident/ investigable incident to national and foreign authorities	Office of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee-Bangladesh notified to all relevant Authorities and Agencies as per Standard 4.1 of ICAO Annex 13	
2.1.2 Identification of the Accident/ Serious Incident/ Investigable Incident Investigation Authority	Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee-Bangladesh (AAIC-BD)	
2.1.3 Accredited Representation	Having received the notification from the AAIC-BD, the Air Investigation Transportation of Safety Board of Canada responded immediately and appointed one non-travelling accredited representative and confirmed that he would remain standby for any kind of support, should the AAIC-BD require. The investigator-in- charge, designated by the Head of AAIC-BD, established communication with the accredited representative of TSB Canada for necessary information and cooperation.	
2.1.4 Organization of the Investigation	Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee-Bangladesh (AAIC-BD)	
2.1.5 Authority releasing the report	Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee-Bangladesh (AAIC-BD)	
2.1.6 Date of publication or dispatch of report	29 May 2025	
2.1.7 Brief resume of the circumstances leading to the accident/ serious incident/ investigable incident.	During take-off from Cox's Bazar Airport, immediately after take-off, the ATC controller, having found that one wheel rolled over the runway and went west of the runway abeam Tower/ Runway Centre area, informed the flight crew about the occurrence.	

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3. BODY

3.1 FACTUAL INFORMATION

3.1.1 History of the flight:

3.1.1.1 Flight number	BG-436
3.1.1.2 Type of operation	Commercial (Passenger)
3.1.1.3 Last point of departure	VGCB, Cox's Bazar airport
3.1.1.4 Time of departure (Local time or UTC)	0713 UTC
3.1.1.5 Point of intended landing	Dhaka
3.1.1.6 'Flight preparation'	As per company procedure
3.1.1.7 Description of the flight and events leading to the accident/ serious incident/ investigable incident, including reconstruction of the significant portion of the flight path, if appropriate.	On 16 th May 2025, the aircraft S2-AJW was operated as passenger flight from Dhaka to Cox's Bazar with Call-sign BG 435 and landed at approximately 0642 UTC at Cox's Bazar. The aircraft had no technical defect. The riding engineer performed the PFI check as per the checklist and declared the aircraft serviceable for next flight to Dhaka (BG 436). The PIC accepted the aircraft and departed Cox's Bazar at 0713 UTC (Take-off 0721 UTC). According to the flight crew the take-off was uneventful. However, the ATC controller found that during the take-off roll, one wheel of the aircraft got detached from the landing gear assembly and rolled over the runway resting aside on ground. When the aircraft was climbing normally, the ATC Controller informed the flight crew about the detachment of the wheel. The PIC decided to continue the flight to Dhaka.
3.1.1.8 Location (Latitude, longitude, elevation)	During the final approach at Dhaka, the PIC extended the landing gear and requested the riding engineer to confirm the condition of the main landing gear. The riding engineer moved to the mid-section of the cabin to get a clear view of the landing gears, especially about the missing wheel. He observed that the right main landing gear had both wheels intact, whereas, the inboard main wheel (no. 2) of the left main landing gear was missing. The riding engineer informed the flight crew accordingly. The flight crew declared emergency and landed safely at VGHS at about 0820 UTC. The aircraft cleared the active runway and was switched off and parked at South Alpha taxiway. All passengers were disembarked without any injury/ harm.
	ft)
3.1.1.9 Time of the accident (Local or UTC)	0721 UTC
3.1.1.10 Whether day/night	Day

3.1.2 Injuries to Persons

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others
3.1.2.1 Fatal	None	None	None
3.1.2.2 Serious	None	None	None
3.1.2.3 Minor	None	None	None

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3.1.3 Damage to Aircraft (Brief Description)

3.1.3.1 Destroyed	No			
3.1.3.2 Substantially	Brief description of the Damage:			
damaged				
	(a) Damage Parts:			
	SL			
	No.			
	1.	Outer Bearing Grease Seal metal Part		39-189
	2.	Inner Bearing Grease Seal metal Part		39-188
	3.	Cone Bearing (Inner)		28685-20629
	4.	Cone Bearing (Outer)		29675-20629
	5.	Bearing Cup (Inner & Outer)		29620-20629
	6.	Bearing Roller (Qty-02)(Inner & Outer Bearing	ng)	29685-20629 &
	-	MILLOL		29675-20629
	7.	Metal Chips		40407.0
	<u>8.</u> 9.	Axle Nut 46127-3 Saddle 46135-1		
	9.			40135-1
	(b) Missing Pa	orto:		
	SL	Part Name Part No		
	No.			
	1.			
	2.			
	3.	Bearing Cage (Inner & Outer Bearing)		685-20629 &
	-	Non-Metal part (Inner & Outer grease 29675-20629 seal) 39-188 & 39-189		
	4.			188 & 39-189
	5.			685-20629 &
		29675-20629		
3.1.3.3 Slightly damaged	Nil			

3.1.4 Other Damage:

3.1.4.1 Brief Description of other Damage Nil

3.1.5 Personnel information

3.1.5.1 Pertinent	Pilot in Command (PIC)		First Officer (FO)	
information concerning	Date of Birth	: 15-09-1978	Date of Birth	: 16/05/1994
each of the flight crew	Age	: 46+	Age	: 31
members regarding	Nationality	: Bangladesh	Nationality	: Bangladesh
age, validity of	License	: ATPL (A) 320	License	: CPL 792
licenses, ratings,	Ratings	: DHC-8 Q400	Ratings	: DHC-8 Q400
mandatory checks,	Flying Experience (Total)	: 11000: 00 +	Flying Experience (Total)	: 1207:05
flying experience (total	Flying Experience on type	: 900+	Flying Experience on type	: 1066:55
and on type) and	License Validity	: Non- Expiry	License Validity	: Non-Expiry
relevant information on	Medical Status	: Class 1(validity	Medical Status	: Class 1(validity
duty time		31/01/2026)		01/05/2026)

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3.1.5.2 Brief statement of qualifications and experience of other crew members	N/A
3.1.5.3 Pertinent information regarding other personnel, such as air traffic	Will be provided in the final report
services, maintenance, etc., when relevant	

3.1.6 Aircraft information

3.1.6.1 Brief statement on airworthiness and maintenance of the aircraft (indication of deficiencies known prior to and during the flight to be included, if having any bearing on the	 (a) As per ATL records and Airworthiness documents available a Engineering production and planning department of Biman, D 400 aircraft, Reg. S2-AJW was serviceable before departure Dhaka for respective flight on 16 May 2025. 	Dash-8 Q-
accident/ serious incident/ investigable incident)	(b) Dash-8 Q-400 aircraft, Reg. S2-AJW was on transit certificati outstation Cox's Bazar with nil defect and was duly certified b authorized riding engineer for next flight to Dhaka.	
3.1.6.2 Brief statement on performance, if relevant, and whether the mass and centre of gravity were within the prescribed limits during the phase of operation related to the accident/ serious incident/ investigable incident. (If not and if of any bearing on the accident give details.)? All parameters within the prescribed limits during the phase of operation related to the accident give details.)?		
3.1.6.3 Type of fuel used JET-/	A1	

3.1.7 Meteorological information

VIS: 4000 M QNH: 1005.7 FEW: 1000 ft
During Sunlight

3.1.8 Aids to Navigation

3.1.8.1 Pertinent information on navigation aids available,	NDB: 396KHz
including landing aids such as ILS, MLS, NDB, PAR, VOR,	Visual ground aids: Wind socks,
visual ground aids, etc., and their effectiveness at the time?	

3.1.9 Communications.

3.1.9.1 Pertinent information on aeronautical mobile and fixed service communications and their effectiveness?	VHF1: 129.5MHz VHF2: 121.8 MHz
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3.1.10 Aerodrome information


3.1.10.1 Pertinent information associated with the aerodrome, facilities and	VGCB- Single Runway, adequate to
condition, or with the take-off or landing area if other than an aerodrome?	meet the operational requirements.

3.1.11 Flight recorders

3.1.11.1 Location of the flight recorder installations in the aircraft, their condition on recovery and pertinent data available therefrom?	The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) is installed in the tail section of the aircraft, within the Environmental Control System (ECS) compartment. The FDR was found to be in good condition, securely mounted in its designated location. Data was successfully retrieved from the FDR while it remained installed in the aircraft. The AAIT is waiting for the availability of the necessary data.
--	---

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3.1.12 Wreckage and impact information

3.1.12.1 General	(a)	(a) The inboard wheel (no. 2) of left main landing gear got detached during take-off roll.		
information on the site of	(b)	b) The detached wheel was found beside the west of runway.		
the accident/ serious	(C)) The break assembly and the wheel axle of the affected wheel were found intact.		
incident/ investigable	(d)	Details of material failure or com	ponent malfunction remain undetermined and will be	
incident and the		provided in the final report.		
distribution pattern of the	(e)	A few photographs are given below	OW:	
wreckage, detected	. ,			
material failures or				
component malfunctions.			A THE T	
Details concerning the				
location and state of the				
different pieces of the				
wreckage are not				
normally required unless				
it is necessary to indicate				
a break-up of the aircraft		Figure 1: Detached left main	Figure 2: After parking at south alpha.	
prior to impact. Diagrams,		inboard (no.2) wheel		
charts and photographs				
may be included in this		U.A.		
section or attached in the				
appendices				
		The state		
			h h	
	10.01		Relation	
		Figure 3: Missing wheel area	Figure 4: Damaged parts of the detached wheel.	

3.1.13 Medical and pathological information

3.1.13.1 Brief description of the results of the investigation undertaken and pertinent data available therefrom?	Considered not relevant to this incident.
---	---

3.1.14 Fire

3.1.14.1 If fire occurred, information on the nature of the occurrence,	No fire occurred, hence considered not
and of the firefighting equipment used and its effectiveness?	relevant to this incident.

3.1.15 Survival aspects


3.1.15.1 Brief description of search, evacuation and rescue,	All the passengers including flight crew were
location of crew and passengers in relation to injuries sustained,	unhurt and disembarked safely.
and failure of structures such as seats and seat-belt attachments	

3.1.16 Tests and research

3.1.16.1 Brief statements regarding the	During the initial phase of investigation, the AAIT felt that some of the
results of tests and research	damaged parts needed to be tested at OEM laboratory. The dispatching
	and testing of the damaged parts is under process. The results of the
	tests and research will be provided in the final report.

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3.1.17 Organizational and Management Information

3.1.17.1 Pertinent information Biman Bangladesh Airlines Ltd is a CAAB approved Air Operator, Certificate No. concerning the organizations and 2 and operates both wide & narrow-body aircrafts for domestic and international their management involved in flights. It has a total of 21 aircraft in its fleet. With regard to technical information, influencing the operation of the Biman is a CAAB approved Continuing Airworthiness Management Organization aircraft. The organizations include, (CAMO) i.e. CAAB.MG.012 (Ref. AOC No.-2) under its AOC. for example: the operator; the air traffic services; airway, aerodrome The AAIT has learnt that all continued airworthiness management tasks are and weather service agencies; and managed by Biman CAMO. The CAMO manager of Biman is known to ensure the regulatory authority. The maintenance of its aircraft by its own CAAB approved 145 organization, duly information could include, but not approved by CAA Bangladesh. The area of maintenance encompasses all be limited to, organizational maintenance checks of 737-800 Aircraft, up to "C" Checks of B777-300ER & structure and functions, resources, B787-8/9 Aircrafts and "A" Check of DHC-8-402 Aircrafts. At times, however, economic status, management the maintenance activities are done by outside organization with CAAB approval. policies and practices, and regulatory framework?

3.1.18 Additional information

3.1.18.1 Relevant information not already included in 3.1.1 to 3.17.1 Will be provided in the Final Report.

3.1.19 Useful or effective investigation techniques

3.1.19.1 When useful or effective investigation techniques have been	The AAIC-BD uses the investigation
used during the investigation, briefly indicate the reason for using these	technique which is compatible to Annex
techniques and refer here to the main features as well as describing the	13 and associated DOCs of ICAO.
results under the appropriate subheadings 3.1.1 to 3.18.1?	

3.2 ANALYSIS

3.2.1 Details on the Analysis	The analysis with regard to Man, Machine, Environment, Organizational,
	Motivational and any other Aspect will be provided in the Final Report, if required

3.3 CONCLUSIONS

Appended below are the Findings, Causes and/or Contributing factors established in the investigation.

3.3.1.1 Findings	Will be provided in the final report.
3.3.1.2 Causes	Will be provided in the final report.
3.3.1.3 Contributing Factors	Will be provided in the final report.

3.4 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

3.4.1. Details of Safety Recommendations	Will be provided in the Final Report or as and when required.
--	---

4. APPENDICES

4.1	Details of Appendices	Being preserved in a systematic manner in the 'Investigation Folder' held in the office of	
		AAIC-BD.	

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